Joint Doctrine and Task Force Hawk

This thesis seeks to determine if Joint and Army doctrine support attack helicopters in air-only operations. It focuses on Operation Allied Force and the role that Task Force Hawk was assigned. The premise being that because Task Force Hawk lacked a ground maneuver force, Allied Force was unlike any operation the attack helicopters had previously participated in. The thesis, through historical analysis, determines that there exist tensions between the Army and Air Force over the use of attack helicopters. These tensions cloud current discussion over helicopter use. Next, the thesis examines Joint and Army doctrine to determine if the task assigned to the attack helicopters had doctrinal foundation. Finally, the study examines the predeployment training, task organization, and in-country training for the helicopter crews to determine if their preparation was consistent with the requirements of the operations. The thesis concludes that there exists sufficient doctrinal foundation for inclusion of attack helicopters independent of ground maneuver units. Furthermore, although Army operational doctrine supports independent operations, TTPs provide little guidance for the crews in operations independent of a ground maneuver force. Finally, recognizing this fact, the thesis recommends that attack helicopter units participate in Air Force tactical level exercises such as RED FLAG to gain the experience needed for future operations like Allied Force.