Maskirovka

Deception is a subject that has drawn increased emphasis in military studies in recent years. Within our army we are undertaking concerted efforts to improve our capabilities in this area. In a broader arena, it is our most powerful potential enemy who has drawn attention and acclaim in the area of deception. Numerous authors have noted the increased emphasis of maskirovka in Soviet military thought and warned of the vulnerability of the western powers to such a practice. This monograph studies evolving U.S. Army doctrine for deception and Soviet maskirovka doctrine in order to develop a comparative analysis of the two concepts. While appropriate manuals and regulations are drawn on to establish the essence of our doctrine, Soviet concepts are examined primarily through the numerous open source writings on this topic. Historical examples from the second World War are included for the illustration of U.S. and Soviet doctrinal concepts in execution. While the applicability of deception at all levels of war is recognized, this monograph focuses on deception at the tactical level. This study finds that there are great similarities between U.S. Army deception doctrine and Soviet maskirovka. It also finds numerous subtle but significant differences between the two bodies of thought including differences in scale, emphasis, purpose, scope, planning techniques, attention to advanced technologies, and integration with broader doctrine. Differing U.S. and Soviet perspectives on the principle of surprise, and the place that surprise holds within the respective doctrines, are key to much of the contrast between our deceptive practices and Soviet maskirovka. This monograph concludes by offering four doctrinal improvements that are suggested by this comparative analysis. First, the principle of surprise needs to be given more emphasis in the context of our AirLand Battle doctrine. Second, we need to simplify and integrate efforts taken under the separate banners of deception, OP