Organizing Field Artillery for Desert Operations

This study examines the organization for combat of U.S. Army field artillery units operating in a desert environment and determines the adequacy of current doctrine to insure effective field artillery support to U.S. Army heavy divisions conducting combat operations in the desert. An historical analysis of desert operations by the British and U.S. Army forces in North Africa in World War II is presented, and the lessons learned in these actions are examined in light of AirLand Battle doctrine. The study also discusses centralized and decentralized control of field artillery units and examines the differences presented on today's battlefield by the meshing of offensive and defensive operations as exemplified by the AirLand Battle concept outlined in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The study concludes that current doctrine is adequate to support organizing field artillery for combat operations on the AirLand Battlefield. The main problem is in the interpretation of current doctrine based on offensive or defensive operations. The author concludes by stating that to be successful, field artillery units must be organized to provide immediate close fires from field artillery battalions organic to maneuver brigades. The requirement to provide massed fires must be met by the field artillery brigades and battalions from the corps artillery